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Abstract 
Comparisons by countries and by sectors of mergers and acquisitions have usually been performed in 
separate fields of research. A first group of studies, focusing on international comparisons, has 
explored the role of corporate governance systems, investor protection laws and other countries’ 
regulatory institutions as the main determinants of takeovers around the world. A second group of 
contributions has attributed a central role to variations in industry composition, documenting that, in 
each country, mergers occur in waves and within each wave clustering by industry is observed. This 
paper aims to integrate both perspectives and to make comparisons by countries and by sectors, thus 
exploring the role of various driving forces on takeover activities.  
It also intends to consider the specific influence that technological regimes and their innovation 
patterns may exert in reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors. This will be done by 
examining the European experience of the last few years (2002-2005). We found that even in countries 
where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, mergers are less frequent in those sectors where 
innovation is a cumulative process and where takeovers may be a threat to the continuity of 
accumulation of innovative capabilities. 
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“It is hardly necessary to point out 
that competition of the kind we 
have now in mind acts not only 
when in being but also when it is 
merely an ever-present threat. It 
disciplines before it attacks.” 
(Schumpeter, 1943, p. 85)  
1: Introduction1 
Comparisons by countries and by sectors of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have 
usually been performed in separate fields of research2. A first group of studies, 
focusing on international comparisons, has explored the role of corporate governance 
systems, investor protection laws and other countries’ regulatory institutions as the 
main determinants of takeovers around the world (see, for instance, Rossi and Volpin, 
2004). The underlying claim of these studies is that, in better-regulated systems, it is 
easier and less expensive to raise capital and to finance corporate acquisitions. 
A second group of contributions (Andrade et. 2001, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002) has attributed a central role to variations in 
industry composition, documenting that, in each country, mergers occur in waves and 
within each wave clustering by industry is observed. In this field of research, industry-
level shocks (due to technological and regulatory changes) play a central role in 
explaining takeovers and their evolution in time. 
This paper aims to integrate both perspectives and to make comparisons by countries 
and by sectors, thus exploring the role of various driving forces on takeover activities. 
The hypothesis to be tested is the following: economies with higher investor protection 
are more financially developed and have more liquid stock markets. Thus, “they can 
discipline poor management and restructure failing companies more easily than can 
economies that do not have these means at their disposal” (Jovanovic Rousseau, 2001, 
p. 28). This need may come to the fore when shocks occur and poorly managed firms 
fail to react.  
We also intend to consider the specific influence that technological regimes and their 
innovation patterns may exert in reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors. 
                                                
1We wish to thank Slavo Radosevic for his valuable suggestions to a preceding version 
of this paper, presented at the European Association for Comparative Economic 
Studies 9th Conference, Brighton, UK, 7-9 September 2006. We also received helpful 
comments from Paolo Polinori. Naturally, all errors and imperfections are our own. 
 
2One exception is the study by Martynova and Renneboog (2006), in which comparisons by 
countries and by sectors are performed in the European context for the period 1993-2001. 
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Thus, the main contribution intends to be a multidimensional analysis in which both 
technological factors and institutional and sectoral determinants are integrated in a 
unified perspective. Indeed, as we show below, our empirical strategy is to analyze the 
frequency of merger transactions at a sectoral level, controlling for the roles of country 
and institutional variables and focussing on those sectoral disparities associated with 
distinct technological regimes.  
As recently emphasized by Cassiman and Colombo (2006a, p. 1), mergers and 
innovation “are a central piece of today’s competitive strategy development” and the 
integration between these two issues may offer a key contribution. One potential 
implication is that the main differences that characterise sectors in terms of innovation 
and which determine the existence of two distinct regimes, the entrepreneurial and 
routinised sectors, may have an effect on their merger experiences.  
In the first regime, also called Schumpeter Mark I, innovation is radical, investment 
projects are short-lived, capital depreciation is rapid and knowledge and competences 
are general; thus, for this regime, one can expect mergers and acquisitions to be 
frequent and that they may be an efficient way to grow and obtain synergies in R&D 
expenditure. The opposite may be true for the other, routinised regime, also known as 
Schumpeter Mark II, in which innovations are incremental along the existing 
technological trajectory, investments are long-term oriented and human capital and 
skills are firm-specific. (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996)3. In this context, one can expect 
less frequent reallocations by the acquisition of other firms. 
Thus, the well-known hypothesis, according to which mergers can remove excess 
capacity and correct faulty internal governance mechanisms (Jensen, 1993), can be 
reviewed in a new perspective. Indeed, these transactions may be more frequent and 
turn out to be more powerful in differing technological contexts. These hypotheses 
suggest integrating cross-country and cross-sector analysis by focussing on the 
specific influence that technological regimes and their innovation patterns may exert in 
reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors.  
To better clarify our intentions to explore the various dimension of takeover activities, 
let us consider two cases: a country and a firm. The country case is that of Germany. 
                                                
3 A technological regime is identified by the full set of conditions in which innovative 
activities take place (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Recent evolutionary studies have focused on 
relevant aspects of these activities and have made a distinction between two different patterns 
of innovation, originally pointed out by Schumpeter. Henceforth, by ‘technological regimes’, 
we mean the two sectoral models of innovation called SMI and SMII. 
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In this economy, takeovers and hostility are quite rare - a common fact usually 
explained by specificities of its governance system, where insider protection is higher 
and where corporate governance fosters long-term cooperation and encourages firm-
specific investments by lenders, employees and large shareholders (Schmidt, 2003). 
But Germany, a typical system of ‘patient capitalism’ where enduring relations are 
pervasive, is also a country with a more stable population of innovative firms (Breschi 
et al. 2000) and, in comparison with other European economies, it also “emerges as a 
typical Schumpeter Mark II country” (Malerba and Orsenigo 1996, p.464). This may 
partly explain why Germany has a lower incidence of takeover activities.  
Now let us consider the history of a company, Cisco, during the 1990s: 
Cisco was one of the success stories in the exploding high-technology 
area of the New Economy. Cisco began by selling basic Internet 
routers to corporate customers. Cisco evolved from a single-product 
company in routers to become a complete data networking solutions 
provider. What is most relevant for our subject is that, between 
September 21 1993, and October 26 1999, Cisco engaged in more 
than 50 acquisitions. Most of the acquisitions were of relatively small 
size... Its acquisition strategy was defined by four main criteria: 
shared vision, beating competitors to the market, innovation, and 
chemistry. Chemistry or culture, as explained by Michael Volpi, 
Cisco’s vice President of business development, is of key importance. 
He points out that technology in their industry lasts only 18 months, 
so continued innovation is a necessity.” (Weston, Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 2004, p. 104-105). 
 
All the main ingredients to explain the incidence of takeovers are present in the 
Cisco story: the role of a corporate governance system, like that typical of the US, 
with a well-developed stock market that favouring financing of 50 acquisitions, 
mainly of small companies; shackling technology shocks that stimulate a firm to 
become a ‘networking solutions provider’, the specific feature of a sector in which 
technology lasts no more than a year and half! These factors will appear in our 
study, which intends to evaluate on empirical grounds the combined influence that 
alternative technological regimes, different systems of corporate governance and 
industry shocks can play on takeover activities. This will be done by taking into 
account the European experience of the last few years (2002-2005) which seems to 
mark a new wave in M&A activities.  
This comprehensive analysis is another step along the lines suggested by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), two authors who have shown that the industry specialization of 
each country may be seen in its complementarities with its institutional framework. 
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Until now, these complementarities between production regimes and varieties of 
capitalism have not been fully explored in terms of the role of the market for 
corporate control. The present paper intends to be a first attempt at filling this gap. 
By adopting this integrated perspective, in the following sections we explore in 
which systems and sectors mergers are more frequent and can be expected to play a 
role as remedies to faulty governance and/or represent crucial strategies to exploit 
innovative synergies in entrepreneurial industries.  
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the database and clarifies 
some methodological issues of our estimation strategy. Section 3 presents the main 
findings obtained by performing comparisons by countries, by sectors and by 
technological regimes. Section 4 offers some conclusions and signals potential 
fruitful lines of research. 
 
2. Data description 
Our database of mergers and acquisitions comes from Datastream and additional 
information is from Lexis and Nexis. M&A deals refer to eight countries, whose 
activities in the 1990s represented nearly 80% of the European market for corporate 
control4: Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Data on M&A are collected from “Capital Issues and Changes” Datastream 
reports and only transactions related to takeovers and involving a change in corporate 
control are selected. Completed and not completed takeovers, financial and non-
financial sectors are included in our database and total 802 deals, for the period 2002-
2005.  
In order to make comparisons of mergers by sectors and to explore the influence of 
differing technological regimes, we aggregated company data at different levels. 
First, we aggregated the data into 39 four-digit sectors and then into 10 two-digit 
sectors (both classifications are those used by Datastream). These aggregation criteria 
are those provided by the Industry Benchmark Classification (IBC), a system for listed 
companies managed by FTSE and Dow Jones Indexes (2004)5. Table A1 in the 
                                                
4
 See Martynova and Renneboog (2006). 
5
 IBC has six levels of classification, the lowest is the sub-sector and the highest the whole 
market. Each company is allocated to that sub-sector whose definition most closely describes 
the nature of its business and fits the source of its revenue, or the majority of its revenue. The 
basic sources of information used for the classification are audited accounts and directors’ 
reports. A company which operates in two or more sub-sectors is allocated to that sub-sector 
which provides the largest part of the revenue, as indicated by the latest available reports and 
accounts. A company engaged in three or more sub-sectors that are in two or more industries 
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Appendix shows how the 39 four-digit sectors were converted into the 10 two-digit 
industries. 
In the second step, manufacturing sectors6 (which form a subset of 26 out of the 39 
four-digit sectors) were classified and grouped into technological regimes. Three 
groups were obtained: i) Schumpeter Mark I (SMI); Schumpeter Mark II (SMII); a 
residual group, termed Other manufacturing. Table 1 shows the mapping classification 
of four-digit sectors into their corresponding technological regimes7.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In order to clarify how to achieve the mapping classifying shown in Table 1, some 
preliminary information is useful. First of all, it is convenient to recall how the 
classification into technology regimes was originally obtained (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993, 1996). The relevant dimension is innovation activity, and the authors use, as 
proxies, patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO) and consider 49 
technological classes. These classes are created on the basis of the classification 
provided by the International Patent Classification (IPC) (which in turn relies on 
specific applications for patents considered by the World International Patent Office 
(WIPO).  
Further elaborations result in the classification into technological regimes. In 
particular, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) consider four main aspects: i) concentration 
and asymmetries of innovation activity among firms; ii) size of innovating firms; iii) 
evolution over time in the ranking of innovators; iv) comparative importance of new 
innovators with respect to old ones. These four indicators were considered for each of 
                                                                                                                                       
is classified in the sub-sector Diversified Industrials, which in turn belongs to General 
Industrials. 
6
 Note, however, that our data, as shown in Table 1, also include some service sectors: i) 
software and computer-related services; ii) oil equipment-related services; iii) support 
services. The first two groups are not separated from manufacturing activities by the IBC used 
here, and must be included in our database; the third group comprises business sectors closely 
related to production.  
7It must be noted that in our analysis computer and telecommunications have been 
distinguished, respectively, into Hardware (SMII) and Software Computer Industry (SMI) and 
Fixed (SMII) and Mobile Telecommunications (SMI), whereas these distinctions were not 
operated in the original study by Malerba and Orsenigo (1996). Note, also, that new 
methodological refinements yield for the ICT sectoral system, “a more articulated Schumpeter 
Mark I pattern, in which new innovators do not necessarily generate high turbulence in the 
industry, high innovative entry coexists with a certain level of concentration, and in which a 
variety of sources of knowledge coexists with innovations focused on a few technologies.” 
(Corrocher et al., 2007, p. 429). 
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the 49 classes, so that this analysis maps the classes into two distinct technological 
regimes: SMI and SMII.  
In our context, it is necessary to adopt a mapping classification to convert our 26 four-
digit sectors into the two distinct technological regimes. Unfortunately, official 
guidelines for mapping the IPC and IBC classification systems do not exist. However, 
as stressed by WIPO (2006), in the IPC database “…technical subjects of inventions 
may represent products, processes or apparatus (or the way these are used or applied), 
and these terms should be interpreted in the widest sense…” (p. 22). Similar concerns 
for products or industrial processes are used in IBC, a similarity that favours matching 
between the two systems. Moreover, the patent data used in Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1993, 1996, 1997) to obtain technological groupings are gathered for the same 
countries considered here. In addition, a concordance table similar to that used here 
(Table A2 in the Appendix) was adopted in another study (Van Dijk 2000). This table 
permits mapping classification of technological classes, technological regimes, and 
four-digit sectors8.  
Lastly, quantitative information on R&D expenditure and innovative activity are 
gathered by Eurostat, providing detailed documentation at country level. Concerning 
R&D expenses, the average values of business enterprise R&D expenditure in the 
period 2002-2005, as a percentage of GDP, are obtained. Information on innovative 
activity is also drawn from the Fourth Community Innovation Survey (Eurostat) for the 
period 2002-2004, and refers to the percentage of enterprises which introduced 
significant product or process innovations. For both series (R&D expenditure and 
innovation), Eurostat gathers statistical information for the NACE Rev. 1.1 
classification at three-digit level and rearranges the data by establishing six 
technological intensity classes. Four classes refer to the technological intensity of 
manufacturing industries, and two to the knowledge intensity of service sectors. Note 
that this statistical information, which does not match our four-digit IBC industries, 
needs concordance mapping, like that shown in the Appendix, Table A3. It was 
constructed by assigning to each four-digit sector a weight proportional to its incidence 
                                                
8Only four-digit IBC sectors and IPC sub-classes are shown in Table A2, but we also processed 
lower levels of disaggregation with the main aim of operating a finer adaptation and of testing 
the matching criterion adopted here. In any case, it is worth noting that we do not actually need 
strict binary correspondence between pairs of classes, because our analysis only focuses on two 
large groups, i.e., the two technological regimes, which embrace almost all the manufacturing 
sectors, thus avoiding strong distortions in reclassification.  
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in the respective Eurostat technological intensity class. To sum up, the different 
aggregation levels are shown in Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
3 The European merger experience for the period 2002-2005: main findings 
A convenient starting point is a comparison of the number of deals obtained in our 
study for the period 2002-2005 with the figures recorded in the previous M&A wave, 
fully explored in Martynova and Renneboog (2006), one the main contributions for the 
European context9. Table 2 offers some interesting information; in particular, it reveals 
minor changes in the distribution of M&A activity between 1993-2001 and 2002-
2005, as shown by the ranking orders (in brackets). The UK is still top, followed at 
some distance by France and Germany. The Italian market for corporate control looks 
more active than in the past, reaching the ranking position that Sweden had occupied 
in the previous years10. A small increase also affected the share of deals for Denmark. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
However, simple standardisation of absolute figures shows some significant reversals 
among countries in rankings by incidence of takeovers. Indeed, Figure 2 offers better 
comparison of geographical patterns: for each country, the absolute number of deals is 
normalized to the total number of firms included in the Datastream database. 
 
                                                
9
 Both databases refer to transactions involving changes in corporate control, but in Martynova 
and Renneboog (2006) only domestic and intra-European cross-border deals are taken into 
account, while our data set also include extra-European acquisitions. A different database was 
studied by Jackson and Miyajima (2007), covering M&A deals from the Thomson Banker One 
‘Deals’ over the period 1991-2005; the study examines transactions of substantial stakes of 
publicly listed and private firms of three European countries (France, Germany, UK) and of 
Japan and the US. One of the main findings is “the catching up of M&A in Japan, France and 
Germany”…and “some functional equivalence in promoting corporate restructuring” (Jackson 
and Miyajima, 2007, p. 24). 
10
 An interesting investigation of the Italian case, over the period 1991-1994, has been 
performed by Benfratello (2001). The author, by using the Italian and European Union 
Competition authorities data, analyzes three different groups of transactions: privatizations, 
acquisition of independent firms by foreign multinationals, leveraged and management 
buyouts. The study examines their respective performances before and after the change in 
control and finds that the latter group performs better than the control sample. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Additional information is obtained when all transactions are grouped by sectors, and 
can reveal if merger activity clusters significantly in a particular industry: Table 3 
displays the sectoral variation of deals from our Datastream database for the eight 
pooled countries for the period 2002-2005. Data by target firms in each two-digit 
industry are collected and volume activity is measured.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 
In terms of percentages of deals out of total number of firms of each sector one obtains 
the results shown by Figure 3. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Our data clearly confirm that takeovers tend to group in industries and the highest 
performance, in absolute terms, of Consumer Services is worth noting (see Table 3). In 
relative terms, we find Telecommunication (see Figure 3) as the frequency of 
transactions out of the total number of firms reaches its highest value in this sector, 
almost ten points above the average value of the total number of deals. For 
Telecommunications, despite the low number of deals involving change of control, 
relatively speaking, the result is that one-fifth of companies were the target of 
takeovers during 2002-2005.11 Furthermore, merger activity in Telecommunications is 
not a new phenomenon, since a first round of consolidation in the sector occurred in 
the 1990s and was driven by the need to compete with American providers (OECD, 
2001). Thus, a sector classified in the SMII regime on the basis of the 1980s database 
recorded one the highest incidence of takeovers in Europe during the 1990s12 and 
following years, a striking finding that seems to contradict our claims. But some 
caveats are important.  
                                                
11
 Other sources indicate that mergers activities were notable not only in number of deals, but 
also in value: the share market fluctuated from 7% to 11% (Thomson Financial 2002, 2003; 
2004; 2005). Just to name a few cases, let us recall that Olivetti’s acquisition in 2003 of the 
remaining 46% interest in Telecom Italia for $28 billion was by far the largest deal in Europe. 
In the second position we find Telefonica’s planned tender offer for O2 (UK), the second 
largest deal announced for 2005 (Thomson Financial, 2003, 2005). 
12
 See Martynova and Renneboog (2006). 
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First of all, the presence of various business segments grouped into a single sector but 
no longer sharing the same features in terms of innovation properties, such as material 
production and telecommunications services, must be taken seriously into account.13  
These considerations suggest reconsidering mobile telecommunication as a sector 
whose innovation activities are similar to those belonging in SMI regime, as examined 
in recent studies (Corrocher et al. 2007). In any case, mobile and fixed 
telecommunications exhibit marked differentials. A disaggregated analysis of the three 
top markets for corporate control, Consumer Services (CS), Telecommunications (TC) 
and Utilities (U), at a four-digit sectoral level, is shown in Figure 4. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Some other data qualifications are also important. In considering technological 
regimes, it must be noted that, across countries, not all the different economic sectors 
can be classified in the same technological pattern and country-specific effects may be 
present. Some portions of technological classes, even if they are in the minority, do not 
fall in the same regime in different countries.14 
Secondly, it must be noted that not only technological reasons may count on merger 
activities. Market relatedness and organizational synergies are complementary 
explanations that, with technological reasons, may concur to explain merger deals. 
This variety of motivations is well represented by some instructive merger stories 
offered from the US, as well as from the European scene. These case studies show that 
telecommunications are the best example of a sector in which technological 
developments and regulatory changes force and enable firms to found new corporate 
alliances and “to seek new partners across national and technical borders” (Johansson 
and Kang, 2000, p.24). 
                                                
13
 It must be added that very often firms diversify their activities, and not all of them may be in 
the same technological regime. In empirical investigations, this problem is solved by simply 
allocating the company to that sector whose definition most closely describes the nature of its 
business; thus some unexpected relations between takeover activities and technological 
regimes are simply the outcomes of diversification, since company mergers may have occurred 
in none prevailing business areas.  
14By classifying technological classes, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, p. 464-465) find, for a 
panel of six industrialized countries, that only a majority belongs to the same technological 
regime in different countries (34 out of 49 technological classes). Similar results, 18 out of 26 
in a sample of three countries, were obtained by Breschi et al. (2000, p. 399). 
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For instance, our first case study concerns the AT&T and BellSouth deal. This was a 
response to the cable industry to be a ‘triple player’ in communications. Thus, the 
scope of the merger was not only a reduction in operating services, but also the 
complementarities that make it possible for a unified corporation to sell a “bundle” of 
services, from fixed, to mobile telephony, to broadband internet and television. The 
acquisition turned out to be successful, and not by chance: it occurred when the two 
companies, AT&T and Bellsouth, had already started to build fast fibre-optic networks 
and had reached well-matching competences and capabilities!15 
Let us now consider our data and look at a cross-border intra-European deal. Here, the 
story is that of the Spanish Telefonica bid for Britain’s O2 in 2005, and the merger 
represented a potential strategy for entering new markets and selling new products. 16 
It happened at a crucial moment, when the big incumbent European firms had to face 
two main challenges: a continent-wide wave of consolidation in an enlarged European 
market, and product innovations, since mobile and wireless technology was 
increasingly becoming a substitute for fixed calls. These two main challenges were 
clearly identified by César Alierta, Telefonica’s chairman, who explaining the 
proposed acquisition as “a way of broadening the firm’s reach across different markets 
and technologies”17.  
Additional evidence and detailed reports show that “technological advances and 
regulatory reform are changing the traditional borders of who is doing what and 
where”. In addition, competition, stimulated by regulatory reform, has meant that “the 
incumbent former monopolies need to respond to customer needs and shareholder 
demands” (Johansson and Kang, 2000, p. 24). Mergers and acquisitions, as well 
corporate alliances, are some of the responses to these structural changes. 
But some other sectors play an active role in the European market for corporate 
control. Consumer Services and Utilities have been the second and third most active 
markets for corporate control: 18.97% and 14.40% of companies were targets of M&A, 
respectively, as Figure 4 shows. The growing importance of service sectors in 
advanced economies, combined with the success of Information and Communication 
                                                
15
 See The Economist, 31/11/2006, issue 8468.  
16
 At the time of the acquisition, Telefónica’s business sectors comprised both fixed and 
mobile telephony, while O2 was only active in mobile telephony. Some complementarities 
arose from their respective geographical location, since Telefónica provides its services in 
Spain and the Czech Republic, whereas O2 was active in the UK, Germany and Ireland. 
17
 See The Economist, 11/5/2005, Vol. 377, issue 8451. 
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Technologies, the introduction of the Euro, and the interest of manufacturing firms in 
services such as retail and wholesale trade, probably boosted merger activity in these 
industries. Unlike Utilities, deals in Consumer Services were larger in number terms 
(178 was the largest absolute number of deals in industries for the 2002-2005 period) 
but not in value (see Thomson Financial, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005)18.  
The basic sources of industry shocks in two of the three sectors displaying a more 
intense change in control (telecommunications and utilities) may be at least partially 
attributed to privatization and liberalization, as already detected for 2000-2001 by the 
European Commission (2001)19. Thus, the prediction that bursts of merger activity 
concentrate in industries which are undergoing shocks of significant magnitude seems 
to be confirmed in our database.  
In our analysis, as already mentioned, we group sectors by technological regime. As 
discussed in Section 1, technological regimes may constitute a context in which to 
observe systematic differences in takeover frequencies. In particular, the specific 
knowledge-based system characterising the SMII regime, centred on higher 
investments on R&D, may raise structural barriers and limit the market for corporate 
control, an expectation that finds some support from our dataset, as seen below. 
To conclude, a binomial test was performed to evaluate the significance of the 
differences between frequencies of M&A by countries, by sectors, and by 
technological regimes. The differences between frequencies and their statistical 
significance are shown in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
                                                
18
 Manufacturing sectors also played an important role. The relative frequencies of takeovers in 
the sectors of Industrial and Consumer Goods were nearly equal to the average: 12.64% and 
12.34% respectively (see Table 4); in terms of value, Thomson Financial estimated a share 
market ranging from 7% to 11% for Industrial and from 3 to 6% for Consumer Goods, for 
2002-2005. Lastly, it is worth noting that, over the 1990s, a considerable number of deals in 
industries such as plastics, metals, machinery, food, textile, chemicals, was detected by the 
European Commission (2001). In particular, this number has remained more stable during the 
last decade, responding less to the evolution of the economic cycle, in both upswing and 
downturn (European Commission, 2001). 
19
 As reported in December 2001 by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs,“…as a consequence of privatization and liberalization, the number of cases in the 
network industries continues to increase steeply, as it has done since 1995. In 2000-2001, post 
and telecommunications accounted for over 11% of all cases, while electricity and gas 
accounted for a further 5% (European Commission, 2001, p. 17). 
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As shown by Table 4, differences by countries, sectors and technological regimes exist 
and are statistically significant.  
The positive values of the first column of Table 4 (Panel A) confirm that the UK is the 
most active player in the market for corporate control, and show a positive and significant 
difference (at the 1% level) of the relative incidence of deals with respect to that observed 
in all the other countries of our database (Panel A, column 1). The opposite is obtained for 
Germany (Panel A column 3), where the gap is negative and significant (at the 1% level). 
The results also indicate that, in most cases, the null hypothesis that M&A is uniform 
across sectors can be rejected: inter-industry variations also seem to be confirmed for the 
European experience of the last few years (Panel B). Lastly, the activity of the market for 
corporate control in SMI sectors was significantly higher than in almost all other 
industries classified as SMII sectors (Panel C): the relative frequency of takeovers within 
manufacturing sectors included in SMI (13.10%) is significantly higher than in SMII 
(9.77%). 
These results give raise to many questions. For instance, the dispersed ownership structure 
prevailing in the UK, which may require discipline exerted by raiders, can be advocated to 
explain the high incidence of takeovers there. But how to interpret the high incidence of 
takeovers, at least in relative terms, recorded in Italy? Or, conversely, the low number of 
deals in Finland? Why, in the UK, are higher figures recorded in mobile rather than fixed 
telecommunications? How to disentangle the role of deregulation, as happened for utilities, 
from the impact of R&D expenses featuring biotechnologies?  
A further step is to identify some main determinants of M&A and to test their role by 
econometric estimates.  
4. Determinants of merger activities and results 
Frequencies of M&A activities are estimated by considering three dimensions: country 
and institutional variables, sectoral factors and technological regimes. The following 
section offers a brief discussion aimed at identifying a set of variables for our 
estimates.  
4.1 Country and institutional variables 
A) Wealth  
It is important to control for differences in macroeconomic conditions across countries 
and the first factor to be considered is the country’s wealth, which is proxied by the 
logarithm of the per capita GDP. But, as shown in Figure 5, divergences in 
geographical patterns are only partially explained by considering the GDP weights of 
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each single country20. Clearly, additional causes are required to explain why some 
countries have a lower number of operations than those expected from the size of their 
economies. Germany, France, and Italy itself are good examples. 
By comparing the economic weight of each country with its M&A activity, the top up 
position of the UK is confirmed (Figure 5). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
  
B) Ownership and control 
A second factor to be considered is corporate ownership and control. Countries in 
which ownership is heavily concentrated may be involved in very few takeovers, since 
large shareholders have enough incentives and power to exert control over managers; 
they are also in a stronger position to adopt defensive strategies aimed at impeding 
hostile bids. However, the impact that ownership and control structure may exert on 
takeovers is controversial, since the benefits of large shareholders in facilitating 
takeovers may be significant (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Indeed, in a widely held corporation, a serious free-riding problem exists: in a context 
of dispersed shareholders, where control is a public good, internalization of the 
benefits of collective action is hindered by the tendency of individual shareholders to 
avoid monitoring costs and take advantage of monitoring activities performed by other 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980).21 The presence of a large (minority) 
shareholder, not allied with management, provides a partial solution to the Grossman- 
Hart problem, since this owner is able as well as motivated to initiate or favour other 
parties to undertake a takeover deal. Hence, as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show on 
theoretical and empirical grounds, concentrated ownership and the presence of a large 
shareholder lead to the possibility of overcoming the free-riding problems of dispersed 
possession. Hence, a positive correlation between the structure of ownership and 
takeovers activity may reasonably be obtained, as in the cross-country comparisons 
performed by Rossi and Volpin (2004). By contrast, following Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), it is also possible to argue that expropriation activity by controlling 
                                                
20
 Italy, for instance, has shown an M&A share of 6.4%, while having a 12.7% weight in terms 
of GDP. 
21In fact, ‘if a shareholder thinks that the raid will succeed and that the raider will improve the 
firm, he will not tender his shares, but will instead retain them, because he anticipates a profit 
from their price appreciation’ (Grossman and Hart, 1980). It must be added that the 
effectiveness of a market for corporate control is not ensured when competitive conditions are 
not prevailing in product and financial markets, and share prices are not good signals of firm 
performance. This implies that good corporate governance must be accompanied by pro-
competition and anti-trust legislation. 
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shareholders, adopting self-dealing strategies at the expense of minority shareholders, 
may discourage investors and obstruct hostile bids. The net balance between opposite 
predictions is ambiguous and must be tested by econometric estimates. 
C) Investor protection  
The relation between concentration and takeover activities may also be the outcome of 
a systematic relation between ownership concentration and legal factors. Indeed, La 
Porta et al. (1998, 1999) argue that better protection increases shareholders’ 
willingness to invest and encourages a more dispersed ownership structure22. It is only 
by controlling for investor protection that one can disentangle the two effects. The 
problem is ultimately empirical and will be tested with econometric estimates.  
Indeed, a cross-country comparison explicitly considering the role of laws and 
regulations offers complementary insights. Investor protection laws and other 
countries’ regulatory institutions may be crucial determinants explaining why firms 
are owned and financed so differently in different countries, as argued in La Porta et 
al. (1998). The authors make considerable efforts to elaborate accurate indicators for 
shareholders’ rights, and have recently revised the original index for investor 
protection, the so-called anti-director rights, thus offering a new and more accurate 
measure (revised anti-director rights), which better distinguish between enabling rules 
and mandatory or default provisions.23The revised index is also based on laws and 
regulations updated to May 2003 and is more useful for our purposes.  
In our perspective, one must ask whether better legal rules, by improving the 
functioning of financial markets, end by favouring merger and takeover activities and 
allowing corporate assets to be directed toward their best possible use. Two main 
channels must be considered: i) shareholders’ protection permits liquid stock markets 
                                                
22
 A group of papers (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999), by large cross-sections of countries 
indicators, show that legal origin is correlated with the size of stock markets, ownership 
concentration and other indicators of financial systems. However, many criticisms have been 
raised on this classification. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that the correlation of legal 
origin and the development of financial markets did not hold at the beginning of the 20th 
century and document a ‘great reversal’ by historical trends. Roe (2003) claims that the 
correlation between classifications of corporate law and ownership concentration is spurious 
and misleading, since it fails to captures the influence of missing variables. More scepticism 
on causality arguments, between legal origin and financial indicators is obtained by 
considering individual countries’ experiences for Western and Eastern European countries 
(see, respectively, Becht, 1999, and Pistor, 2004). 
23
 The authors also propose new indexes of the strength of minority shareholder protection 
against self-dealing by the controlling block-holder (anti-self-dealing index) for a group of 72 
countries. For a methodological explanation of these new indicators, see Djankov et al. (2008, 
tab. I). 
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and lowers the financial costs of takeovers; ii) it impedes or makes more difficult 
takeover defences adopted by management or other large incumbents. Both effects are 
conducive to a more developed market for corporate control.  
Some qualifications must be mentioned. First of all, not all measures affording 
shareholders’ protection have a direct and positive impact on takeovers. Let us 
consider one of the five provisions concerning voting rights attached to shares. In 
principle, one can argue that “investors may be better protected when dividend rights 
are tightly linked to voting rights” (La Porta 1998, p. 1126). However, deviations from 
the clause ‘one share –one vote’ reduce the number of share transfers necessary to 
obtain a change in control and may make it less difficult to finance takeovers, a well 
known claim advanced by Grossman and Hart (1980) and Harris and Raviv (1988). 
Takeover regulation may be an important determinant of transfers of control, since it 
affects the costs and benefits of these transfers, as extensively analyzed by Bebchuk 
(1994). For instance, when ownership is highly concentrated, a law that allows sharing 
of the control premium may tend to align the interest of controlling and minority 
shareholders and thus it prevents value-destroying takeovers which only ensure private 
benefits of control to the dominant block-holder.  
Instead, in widely held firms, legal provision of squeeze-out rights solves free-riding 
problems caused by dispersed possession. Indeed, each individual shareholder, 
anticipating that the post-takeover share price will exceed the offered price, prefers not 
to tender. The squeeze-out rule, giving the controlling shareholder the right to force 
minority shareholders to sell their shares, solves free-riding problems and thus allows 
raiders to make value-increasing acquisitions (Burkart and Panunzi, 2004). 
All these and other provisions have been recently harmonized for the European Union 
member states by EU Directive 2004/25, and the debate as to whether uniform 
national legislation produces identical effects in countries with heterogeneous 
corporate governance regimes is still ongoing (Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, 
2005). In any case, it should be noted that some of the member states of our database, 
which covers the period 2002-2005, only brought the provisions of the Directive into 
force in 2006, and that the Directive leaves some discretionality to national legislators. 
Thus, in a heterogeneous legislative environment like that typical of European 
countries, it is convenient the test the role of different takeovers rules on merger deals. 
One explanatory variable of our estimates is thus a synthetic index that captures the 
role of different measures: i) mandatory bid rule; ii) and iii) squeeze-out and sell-out 
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rules; iv) ownership and control transparency; v) passivity rule in terms of board 
neutrality with respect to anti-takeover defences; vi) break- through rule24 (see Table 
5). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
It should be noted that other factors, such as enforcement of law, or accounting 
standards, are important to our analysis. For instance, in Italy there is a weak 
governance regime, notwithstanding the legal reforms and improvements undertaken 
in 1998, and the quality of enforcement remains unsatisfactory25. Thus, the same 
increase in ‘formal’ shareholders’ rights translates into lower effective improvement, 
and one can obtain a lower impact on M&A activities by econometric estimates, as 
shown for the Italian case in Rossi and Volpin (2004, pp. 283-286). Indeed, the index 
for the quality of the legal system, which includes judicial independence, the 
impartiality of courts, and protection of intellectual property rights (see Manchin, 
2004) has the lowest score in Italy (Table 6). 
Additional important determinants are accounting standards that allow information to 
be gathered on potential target firms and ensure greater transparency. Unfortunately, 
the update measures of this last indicator for the eight countries selected in our 
database are not available, and have been omitted in our estimates. 
Summing up, a wide spectrum of factors, covering the structure of ownership, 
shareholders’ rights, the quality of the legal system and takeover regulation may play a 
significant role. Table 6 presents a picture of some of the various indicators for the 
eight European countries selected in our analysis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
In Europe, the polarization between two opposite situations (UK and Germany) clearly 
reflects some well-known differences between two distinct regimes of corporate 
                                                
24Additional information on the criteria adopted to obtain the index of takeover regulation 
adopted here is available upon request. 
25 For recent corporate governance reforms in France, Italy and Germany, see Enriques and 
Volpin (2007). 
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governance, which a huge literature has compared in many surveys26. Indeed, as 
recently reviewed by Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005), there is a sharp 
segmentation between ownership patterns in continental Europe and in the UK27, 
revealed by comparing the average ownership of the three largest shareholders, as 
shown by La Porta et al. (1998) for the ten largest firms of each country28 (first 
column of Table 6 of this paper). The lower concentration figures are in the UK, while 
the highest in Italy and Germany. Similar results by Faccio and Lang (2002) for a 
different dataset, which included medium and small financial and no-financial 
companies, show that widely held firms have the highest incidence in the UK (63% of 
firms) and the lowest in Germany (10.37%).  
As well observed by Goergen and Renneboog (2003, p. 141) “Not only does the 
concentration of control differ between these countries, but so does the nature of 
ownership: Germany is characterized by inter-corporate equity relations and family 
control whereas institutional shareholders hold most of the voting rights in the UK. 
Also, German firms are on average more than 50 years old when they are floated, 
whereas UK IPOs are only 12 years old”29. Thus, for Germany, often named as an 
‘insider’ system, stable ownership, a strong role for banks and inter-firm relations30, 
the active role played by employees can explain the implementation of long-term 
relationships and the lesser importance of a market for corporate control.  
However, Table 6 also shows that European shareholder capitalism is quite 
heterogeneous, as indicated by the dataset for concentration, as well as the 
discrepancy between ownership and control.31 Confirmation of these heterogeneities 
comes from enforcement of shareholders’ rights. Table 6 shows not only the high 
quality of legal protection afforded in the common law country (UK), but also the 
                                                
26See, among others, Prowse (1995), Maher and Andersson (1999), Allen and Gale (2000), 
Gugler (2001), Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) and Denis and McConnell (2003). 
27
 See the main studies by La Porta et al. (1998), Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang 
(2002). 
28
 The study by La Porta et al. (1998) refers to a larger dataset which includes 49 countries.  
29
 For a comparison between the German stakeholder model and the UK shareholder model, 
see Chilosi and Damiani (2007). 
30
 As shown in Prowse (1995), in Germany the percentage of common stocks owned by other 
non-financial enterprises has been estimated at more than 40% of all stocks, with respect to 
only 1% recorded for the UK.  
31
 As found by Faccio and Lang (2002), in the Scandinavian countries and Finland the cash 
flow rights of the largest ultimate owners are lower than those observed in Germany, but 
higher than the corresponding figures recorded in the UK. The authors document values of 
30.96, 31.47 and 37.43% for Sweden, Norway and Finland, respectively (Faccio and Lang, 
2002, p. 389). 
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various scenarios offered by Continental Europe where, for example, Italy and 
Denmark have a different quality of legal systems. In the various cases, ownership 
structures may be predicted to exert a differential impact on the functioning of the 
market for corporate control. We shall see later if these predictions are confirmed by 
econometric estimates.  
 
 
4.2 Sectoral factors 
 
Concerning the sectoral dimension, our aim is twofold: i) to detect the role of industry 
factors on takeover frequencies; ii) to discover their reallocation properties and to test 
the neoclassical hypothesis that sees these transactions as efficient restructuring 
strategies.  
Following Manne (1965), it is well known that mergers and acquisitions may be 
valuable strategies that improve corporate governance. The reason, provided in 
Manne’s seminal paper, is that “...the lower the stock price, relative to what it could be 
with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those 
who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently” (Manne, 1965, 
p.113). These statements, advanced at firm level, must be considered in a sectoral 
perspective.  
Here, the neoclassical theory of mergers offers a refinement of the original, firm-level 
analysis, and sees these transactions as an efficiency-improving response to various 
industry shocks. On one hand, the basic hypothesis is that technological shocks 
occurring at industry level (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002) and antitrust policy 
or deregulation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) cause a high degree of dispersion of the 
firms’ opportunities. The different Q-ratios achieved by the different firms induce the 
acquisition of bad performers by more successful ones, thus promoting efficient 
selection. Thus, an intense takeover activity signals a capital reallocation faster process 
and more efficient than that obtained by higher flows of entry and exit of firms 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002). 
On the other hand, however, the managerial literature gives a less optimistic view. As 
explored at a firm level of analysis, many disadvantages may be associated with 
takeovers, since they represent not only an efficient way to correct agency problems, 
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but also manifest agency problems themselves. 32 An extension of these models at a 
sectoral level must face the hard task of reconciling two stylized and contemporaneous 
facts, not fully consistent with the neoclassical approach: industry merger waves and 
poor profitability for acquirer firms. 
This challenge motivates a second group of models focussing on inefficiencies and 
offering a view dominated by managerial or market failures. Indeed, merger waves 
may be explained by a sort of ‘race for firm size’ adopted by self-interest and rational 
managers who intend to increase the firm’s size and thus reduce the probability of 
acquisitions by other firms (Gorton et al. 2005). Thus ‘eat’ is an escape ‘to be eaten’33, 
a value-destroying strategy capable of explaining both merger clustering and low 
returns of bidder firms. But a chain reaction may also be the outcome of hubris (Roll, 
1986) and herding, which cause a propagation of errors and generate the wave 
phenomenon. Hence, in this perspective, rational and less than rational managerial 
strategies are conducive to inefficiencies and misallocation of corporate resources. 
According to this second group of models, one may expect the limited influence of low 
pre-bid share price performance as a determinant of changes in control34.  
In a different line of research, market failures are considered and a complementary 
hypothesis, advanced by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), considers a scenario dominated 
by rational managers in environments featuring irrational financial markets. Here, the 
dispersion of the ratio of market to book values between firms reflects erroneous 
evaluations by markets, not a real difference in their efficiency. In such circumstances, 
equity prices deviate from fundamental values, as happens in bull markets, and the 
management of over-evaluated firms use their equities to buy the undervalued assets of 
the other ones. On their part, target managers, adopting self-interest and short-term 
strategies, prefer to sell stocks, even when they know their firm will be worth more in 
the long run. Thus, executives reap gains from mispricing, and mergers become “a 
                                                
32
 Executives choose to buy target firms in order to increase their power and to divert free cash 
flows (Jensen, 1986), instead of returning it to investors; therefore acquisitions may be used 
for managerial empire building (Marris, 1964) or represent a diversification device of the 
managers’ human capital risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Other behavioural motivations 
grounded on agency problems, such as management entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; 
Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995) imply that executives over-invest in manager-specific projects that 
make it costly for the firm to replace the incumbent manager.  
33
“Eat Or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves” is the title of the study by 
Gorton et al. (2005).  
34Shleifer and Vishny (2003) have shown that, in bull market episodes characterized by 
irrational financial markets, the observed dispersion of stock prices between firms does not 
reflect a real difference in their efficiency, but simply erroneous evaluations and mispricings. 
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form of arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient markets.” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003, p. 296) 
To summarize, ex-ante low values of the Tobin’s Q of the target firms may be a sign of 
their inefficient management or a manifestation of errors in pricing; in any case it is a 
significant explanatory variable that probably triggers sectoral acquisitions.  
By contrast, under the alternative assumption advanced by the managerial literature 
mentioned above, ex-ante Tobin’s Q market values have a moderate influence, and the 
seriousness of agency costs of acquiring firms may become important35. Additionally, 
efficiency-related reasons, due to economies of scale or scope, or attempts to create 
market power, may play some role, and sole attention to industry shocks and 
mismanagement has a poor interpretative role. 
According to this brief discussion, and following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), we 
take into account industry shocks, whatever the various sources underlying them, by 
introducing abnormal industry performances. Lastly, for each sector we added the 
average values of the ratio of market to book values of target firms.  
 
4.3 Technological regimes  
 
One expected hypothesis of our analysis is that countries and sectoral patterns may 
also be explained by the main differences that characterise sectors in terms of 
innovation processes. Thus the existence of two distinct regimes, the entrepreneurial 
and routinised sectors, may have a significant impact on mergers.  
As already mentioned, the first regime, type of SMI, reveals the lower stability of the 
hierarchy of innovators, a lower concentration ratio of the more innovative firms, and 
a higher proportion of new innovators with respect to the old ones (Audretsch, 1996; 
Dosi, 1988; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993, 1996).36 
In this more turbulent environment, mergers and acquisitions are expected to be more 
frequent, and may be an efficient way of growing and obtaining synergies in R&D 
                                                
35
 For instance, the evidence obtained for the UK by Franks and Mayer (1996) shows that the 
UK market for corporate control “does not function as a disciplinary device for poorly 
performing companies”(Frank and Mayer, 1996, p.180). Indeed, the authors do not find 
significant differentials in terms of performances between acquired and bidder firms. The “free 
cash flow” motivation of bidder management, as well as the entrenched behaviour of target 
management, who resist takeover bids, are they two main drawbacks arising in the market for 
corporate control. 
36
 Other main references are Nelson and Winter (1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1982), 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) and Breschi et al. (2000). 
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expenditure. The opposite may be true for the other, routinezed, regime, SMII. Here, 
innovations are incremental along existing technological trajectories and a less 
frequent reallocation process by acquisitions of other firms may be expected since the 
newly hired workforce has to spend time and effort in order to operate efficiently in 
specialised routines. 
Some qualifications are needed here, since recent contributions offer a finer 
classification of sectors and suggest the adoption of the broader notion of the sectoral 
system of innovations - a different entity which only partially overlaps that of 
technological regimes. Indeed, according to this multi-dimensional approach, more 
attention has been paid to the source of knowledge, degree of application, pervasivity 
of innovations, and finally, the role of actors, not only firms, interacting with each 
other with market and non-market relations37. An instance is the role of public sector 
organizations, or the various institutions that have promoted the creation of new 
protocols and favoured the adoption of standards and coordination in 
telecommunications, as shown in Edquist (2004). Another good example comes from 
a country belonging to our database and from the role played by the National 
Telecommunication Council, created in Sweden in 1990. Without mentioning other 
paradigmatic cases for a country not present in our database, like the US; here, a 
prominent example is offered by ARPANET, the earliest forerunner of the Internet, 
which originated from public grants by the US Defence Advance Research Project 
Agency (Edquist, 2004). Thus, a further step for future research might be the adoption 
of this more comprehensive approach, more suitable for identifying the proper role 
that various national (public) institutions play in each sectoral system of innovation38.  
In the present study, in any case, one important point to be explored is whether 
innovation activities and R&D processes are driving factors capable of explaining the 
occurrence of M&A, and whether potential synergies are conditioned by the 
technological regime in which the corporate transaction is operated.  
                                                
37
 As Malerba writes, the notion of the sectoral system of innovation “… departs from the 
traditional concept of sector used in industrial economics because it examines other agents in 
addition to firms, it places a lot of emphasis on non market as well as on market interactions, 
and focuses on the processes of transformation of the system…”(Malerba, 2002, p.250). 
38
 A second qualification refers to the adoption of technological class, the unit of analysis used 
here to identify patterns of innovations. An improvement on this ground should be represented 
by the adoption of new indicators that better identify the degree of opportunity applications of 
each sectoral system of innovation (Corrocher et al., 2007). For instance, in the ICT field, the 
selection of information from patent abstracts, in terms of recurrence of keywords is useful in 
identifying ICT applications and may reveal a methodological improvement to be extended to 
other sectoral fields. 
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The challenging theme of knowledge and innovation-enhancing strategies represented 
by corporate acquisitions has been the focus of some recent studies. The main intent of 
this literature is to inquire if the innovation performance of acquiring firms is 
influenced not only by the technological base (measured in absolute and relative 
terms) of the companies involved, but also by the degree of relatedness of those 
knowledge bases. An overall evaluation of methodologies and findings in this field of 
research is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it should be noted that the non-
linear impact on the innovation performance of acquisitions emerges: a moderate level 
of relatedness proves superior to high and low levels of relatedness. This result was 
originally found for the chemicals industry by Ahuja and Katila (2001) and later 
extended to other technological sectors by Clodt, Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg 
(2006). At the same time, Cassiman et al. (2005), Cassiman and Colombo (2006b) 
reported similar results for a more variegate sectoral sample: firms that are in 
complementary technological fields exploit the beneficial effects of mergers, whereas 
the combination of firms that have similar innovation projects is not conducive to 
significant advantages from economies of scale in R&D. 
In our empirical research, more than asking what can happen ex-post, in terms of 
innovation capabilities, we inquire what ex ante is the actual propensity to merge 
associated with various innovation regimes. For instance, for chemicals, a sector 
characterized by large firms, continuity in innovative processes, and cumulativeness of 
firms’ capabilities, a lower incidence of M&A is expected.  
Instead, in sectors characterized by creative destruction, R&D processes and efforts are 
probably less serious obstacles for corporate acquisitions. In sum, in our perspective, what 
is explored is the overall question of whether R&D inputs result in the lower probability of 
occurrence of M&A in environments of creative accumulation. Here innovations are 
incremental along existing technological trajectory, and for this regime one can expect 
a less frequent reallocation process by acquisitions of other firms, since newly hired 
workforce has to spend time and effort to operate efficiently in specialised routines. 
At first glance, this expected hypothesis seems to be confirmed by our dataset, since 
takeovers frequencies are negatively correlated with R&Ds in SMII, while the negative 
association is less significant in SMI.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
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Some final remarks concern the combined role of technology and R&D costs with agency 
costs. In an ex-post perspective, as shown by Hitt et al. (1996), one can verify if some of 
the potential synergies accruing from takeovers are dissipated when top executives 
consume energies in undertaking effort-consuming acquisitions, or when long-term 
investments in innovation are postponed for fear of hostile acquisitions. In our ex-ante 
approach, what is important is to test whether firms (or, rather, their ‘agents’) follow 
an active acquisition strategy as a ‘substitute for internal innovation’ (Hitt et al., 1996, 
p. 1089). More precisely, we intend to ascertain if this substitution mechanism is more 
frequent as the probability of disruption of the established routines falls, thus, mainly 
in business sectors where innovation patterns can be typified as SMI. Indeed, in this 
regime of creative destruction, where the opportunities for external synergies are 
higher, managers may adopt an acquisition strategy as a sort of ‘short cut’ to allow 
them to be free riders of innovation efforts undertaken by target firms. After all, for a 
given level of managerial failures spreading across various countries, it is perhaps not 
by chance that, in more than 800 deals found in our database, takeovers only involve 
five chemical firms39!  
This finding, apparently, seems to conflict with other evidence that shows, in a long-
term perspective, that even the chemical industry has solved its overcapacity problems, 
suffering, for instance, during the interwar period, both with mergers and acquisition, 
as well as with corporate alliances, such as the nitrogen cartel between IG Farbel and 
ICI. These were not unique events but phenomena which were repeated in the 1980s, 
whenever acquisitions, and therefore greater market shares, allowed a balance between 
slower demand growth and a decline in profits (Cesaroni et al. 2004, pp. 131-132). But 
what is still remarkable is that, in a sector designed as SMII, such as the chemical 
industry, these corporate deals occurred in situations of diminishing opportunities for 
product innovation, not in phases of technological change and innovation. This is one 
relevant qualification for our estimation strategy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39
 Interesting insights are obtained by considering two of these five deals: the cases of Degussa 
in Germany and the British transaction targeting British Vita. 
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4.4 Estimates 
 
In this section we evaluate the volume of M&A activity and the determinants of 
various patterns observed by countries and by sectors. Table 7 shows the results of our 
regressions on the determinants of takeover activity. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of companies, included in the Datastream 
database, that are targets of mergers or acquisitions in each country and in each four-
digit sector for the whole period 2002-200540 (see Section 2 and Table A5 in the 
Appendix, for a description of dependent and explanatory variables). 
Note that the dependent variable in our regressions is merger intensity (frequencies of 
industry-country deals) and that, for this variable, we have encountered the problem 
that there were no mergers in many industry-countries. In fact, the maximum number 
of observations is 312 (39 four-digit sectors times 8 countries), but our database does 
not contain companies in all 312 sector-countries but only in 286 sector-countries; 
furthermore, mergers and acquisition deals do not occur in all sectors. Indeed, our 
market for corporate control (completed and not completed deals occurring in the 
period 2002-2005) concerns only 175 country-four digit sectors. Moreover, for 
country-sectors not observed data, the regressors are also lost and we have a typical 
truncated data problem (some observations on both dependent and independent 
variables are lost). 
Assuming that the dependent variable yi is a continuous random variable and that xi is 
the vector of regressors, we randomly draw (xi, yi) from a sample of 286 four-digit 
sectors. The selection rule consequently takes the following form:  
si=1[yi >0],  where 0 is the truncation point 
If yi >0 we observe both yi and xi; if yi = 0, we do not observe either yi or xi. and we 
have a truncated random variable model. It is known (see Wooldrige, 2001, and 
Greene 2003), that in this case ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are inconsistent. 
We estimate the parameters of the truncated regression model by applying a maximum 
likelihood estimation method41. 
The estimated model is the following: 
                                                
40
 Unfortunately, we do not have variables structured in panel data because the number of 
sectors in which M&A occur changes from one year to another. For this reason, we carried out 
a cross-section analysis on pooled data for the period 2002-2005. 
41 All estimates were performed with the STATA9 package. The dataset and routines used are 
available upon request. 
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where: 
i=1,…8 Countries 
j=1,…39 Four-digit Sectors 
m=1,…5 Institutional variables (I) 
n=1,2  Sectoral variables (S) 
l=1,2  Technological variables (TEC) 
z=1,2  Technological Regimes dummy variables (TR) 
 
Table 7 presents results for three different set of estimates, which test, respectively, the 
role of institutional, sectoral and technological factors. 
The first three columns (columns a, b, c) include country variables and permit to 
control for differences in institutional conditions. More precisely, the main 
independent variables are the economic wealth of each country, ownership 
concentration, takeover regulation, and other legal factors. In details, the first country 
variable is captured by GDP per capita, whereas two different indices are considered 
for ownership concentration: the average equity stake held in each country by the three 
largest owners (column a), and the percentage of firms widely held (column b). Legal 
variables and investor protection are represented by takeover regulation (column a and 
b), or by anti-director rights (column c), updated to 2003 and revised by Djankov et al. 
(2008). We have also included in each specification the market to book values of 
targets, to capture efficiency potential improvements. All the specifications are 
augmented sectoral dummies introduced to capture the role of specific industry effects.  
Another estimate (column d) tests also the role of sectoral reallocations triggered by 
industry shocks. This effect may be captured by deviations between a particular 
industry’s added value growth with respect to the average values across all 39 
industries.  
The third set of estimates, columns e, f, g, h, evaluates also the role of innovation and 
technological regimes. We tested the null hypothesis that R&D and innovation 
activities, and their differential patterns, do not play an autonomous role in merger 
deals. The sectoral volume of R&D expenses, standardized to value added (column e), 
and the incidence of innovation (column g) are firstly included as total aggregate, not 
differentiated by technological regimes. The other estimates (respectively, columns f 
and h) include the same variables, differentiated into the two regimes. 
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Table 7 reports the coefficients obtained with truncated regressions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
Our econometric estimates confirm the importance of institutional and country-level 
factors as significant determinants of mergers and acquisitions and extend some of the 
conclusions, already reached for the 1990s by Rossi and Volpin (2004), in the last few 
years.  
First, the statistical significance of both the coefficients of ownership structure, 
measured by the two different indices included in the specifications, support the 
prediction that concentration helps to alleviate the free-riding problems that impede 
takeovers in cases of fragmented ownership rights. This finding, obtained when 
shareholder protection variables are included, confirms that ownership may exert an 
autonomous and direct impact, not simply due to its ‘endogenous’ and legally 
determined nature. Thus, by disentangling the effects of ownership and investor 
protection, clearer results are obtained. 
Second, our estimates show that efficient regulation aimed at facilitating these deals 
and at reducing takeover defences is correlated with a more active market for mergers 
and acquisitions. By contrast, legal shareholder protection, measured by the anti-
director rights index, updated and revised by Djankov et al. (2008), does not seem to be 
significant (column c). Hence, the hypothesis that better investor protection is 
correlated with a more active market for mergers and acquisitions, as reported by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004), does not find clear confirmation for the last few years, even when 
the new updated index is used.42 
Additional estimates show that industry changes have an influence in explaining 
takeovers when we control for R&D expenses. This finding suggests that mergers are 
not an unequivocal response to technological or regulatory shocks occurring at 
industry level which promote massive reallocation of resources.  
                                                
42In our estimates, the role of anti-director rights is not significant, even when the updated (not 
revised) index is introduced; no significant results are also obtained when this indicator 
(revised or not) is weighted with the quality of the legal system. In addition, legal families, and 
the presumed associated features on qualities of legal institutions, do not play a significant role 
on the volume of M&A. All these results, not reported in Table 7 for reasons of space, are 
available upon request.  
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Although these findings encourage us to be confident in the role of institutional model, 
they represent a further incentive to deepen analysis of the role played by sectoral 
dimension.  
Note that all our estimates confirm the role of the sectoral values of Tobins’ Q: the ex-
ante Q values of the target firms, as shown in Table 7, are always statistically 
significant. This is a robust finding, and the proxy for Tobin’s Q, included in all the 
specifications reported in the table, significantly improves the goodness of fit. 
However, explaining this finding is controversial and difficult. As already mentioned, 
one plausible interpretation, according to agency theory, is the ‘underperformance 
hypothesis’, according to which sectors that exhibit low market valuations relative to 
real assets also record higher frequencies of acquisitions. If these takeovers are aimed 
at restructuring poorly performing firms, the result, as claimed by Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002, p.198), is that “mergers are a channel thorough which capital flows to 
better projects and better management.” Instead, we cannot discard the hypothesis that 
low sectoral values reflect not poor performances, but erroneous market evaluations, 
along the lines suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Further study, considering 
alternative performance indicators, independent of stock market valuations, and 
properly selecting and filtering out firm-level and industry-wide causes, should make 
our interpretations more convincing. Similar improvements could be obtained by 
considering acquirer as well as target performances, and by introducing additional 
explanatory variables to specify the different role of cash or equities methods of 
payments, since the mispricing hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) only explains 
acquisitions with (overvalued) stocks. 
The last set of estimates seems to reject the null hypothesis that R&D costs and the 
incidence of innovators play the same role on M&A, irrespective of the sectors in 
which they are actually spent. The polarization of sectors into two distinct 
technological regimes may also exert an autonomous and significant impact on merger 
deals.  
One related implication is that the maintained hypothesis of a vast body of literature, 
according to which “the takeover route is often the least-cost method to alter industry 
structure” (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996, p. 196) must be reconsidered and partially 
revised. Indeed, both the functions performed by merger activity43, ‘contraction’ 
                                                
43
 See the detailed analysis of Andrade and Stafford (2004), who explore the distinct roles of 
takeovers in terms of expansion and contraction. The authors illustrate how the contractionary 
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(downsizing driven by negative industry shocks and excess capacity) and ‘expansion’ 
(increase in firm size triggered by positive shocks and alternative to internal 
investments) may produce differential benefits when technological and innovation 
processes are taken into account44. A further investigation of these issues seems 
appreciable at a time of intense debate on the role of mergers and when some authors 
(Foster et al., 2002, Blanchard, 2006) claim that most of the productivity gains 
obtained in the American economy (in some sectors more than 90%) were due to 
inter-firm reallocation, rather than efficiency improvements with a given firm. The 
European economies, which still have to remove obstacles that impede takeovers, also 
have to discover in which sectoral fields of specialization merger activity produces 
more beneficial effects and in which it turns out to be detrimental to their varieties of 
capitalism. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
By studying deals in eight European countries, we find that integrated analysis is 
useful in explaining takeover activity, and some main conclusions can be reached: 
country characteristics are important; ownership and regulation may influence country 
patterns; firm market valuations, and thus pre-bid performances between target and 
acquired companies, are significant all over sectors; technological regimes are 
important. 
Indeed, evaluation of a wide range of institutional country variables clearly indicates 
that ownership concentration is not a real impediment to takeovers, since some, 
perhaps friendly, acquisitions may occur even in countries where block-holders are 
present, but where the overall quality of institutions are not conducive to those failures 
represented by private benefits of control. The Nordic countries are good examples.  
In addition, evaluation of some other institutional country variables shows the 
significant role of takeover regulation, whereas investor protection has a lower impact, 
one result which is still controversial. Future research would gain by the availability of 
updated alternative institutional variables; for instance, updating of accounting 
standards by countries could improve analysis, since these variables, by allowing 
                                                                                                                                       
role in the US was restricted to the 1970s and 1980s, whereas expansionary waves were 
typical of the 1990s.  
44
 Not by chance, two typical examples of contraction and expansion waves, reported by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), to be the steel industry and the banking sector, both refer to a 
regime not marked as SMII. 
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information to be gathered on potential target firms, would ensure more transparency, 
reduce expropriations by large incumbents and make the adoption of takeover 
defences more difficult.  
In any case, one robust finding is the role of pre-bid performances: the pre-bid Tobin’s 
Q of target firms is a driving force, since it exerts a significant impact in all our 
estimates. Monitoring functions or erroneous market evaluations? Efficient deals or 
hubris and managerial self-interest strategies? These are matters for further research, in 
which additional evidence on post takeover restructuring processes should help to 
discriminate between the opposite hypotheses of correction of managerial failures, on 
one hand, and redeployment of assets, on the other.  
Lastly, our estimates suggest that barriers to takeover activities are not only 
represented by institutional impediments, but may have an alternative and structural 
explanation: the regime which qualifies the innovation process.  
Two sectoral patterns of innovation were observed, and our findings show their 
differential behaviour in terms of takeover activity. In the first, characterized by 
creative destruction, where the ranking orders of innovators are unstable and entry 
rates of innovators are high, takeovers are more frequent, since innovation follows a 
widening pattern. In the second, featuring creative accumulation and the stability of a 
core of leading innovators, external acquisitions are less frequent, since they represent 
a break in the continuity of deepening innovation processes. Thus, even in countries 
where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, we found that mergers in those 
sectors where innovation is a cumulative process are less frequent. In these sectors, 
takeovers may be a threat, not only to bad management, but also to the continuity of 
accumulation of innovative capabilities. In these cases, higher investments in R&D 
may represent an intrinsic obstacle limiting merger activities and thus impeding the 
destruction of deepening patterns of innovation. Hence, takeovers do not always 
represent, for all sectors, the main mechanism for reducing corporate inefficiencies 
and mitigating agency costs. The evidence collected for the UK, which is the most 
active market for corporate control and where 80% of mergers involve sectors not 
marked as SMII, is significant. It confirms that a comprehensive framework, where 
complementarities between institutional settings and industrial fields of specialization 
are taken into account, is useful for better understanding of those varieties of 
capitalism observed around the world. 
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However, in this multi-dimensional perspective, further steps should be taken and a 
careful examination of post-takeover performances should be empirically undertaken. 
More precisely, two additional questions should be posed: in which corporate 
governance system does merger activity improve shareholder return rather than private 
managerial benefits? in which technological regime does it turn out to be a profitable 
strategy? The first question has animated the value creation and value destruction 
debate on takeovers45. The second one has never been asked.  
It is undeniable that recent studies report that “the corporate takeover market acts as a 
court of last resort, that is, it is an external source of discipline applied when internal 
control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective.”(Kini et al. 2004) This means 
that hostile takeovers do not always represent the main mechanism capable of 
reducing corporate inefficiencies and mitigating agency costs. What is left to discover 
is that this court of last resort is even less desirable when it represents not only a 
‘breach of trust’ but also a ‘breach of knowledge’. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Technological Regimes and Industries
 
SMI SMII Other Manufacturing 
Food producers Aerospace & Defence Mining 
Beverages Oil and Gas Producers Forestry & Paper 
Tobacco Oil Equipment & Services General Industrials 
Household Goods Chemicals Automobiles & Parts 
Personal Goods Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology Support Services 
Construction & Materials Healthcare Equipment  
Industrial Engineering Electronic, Electrical Equip.  
Industrial Metals Fixed Line Telecommunications  
Industrial Transportation Technology Hardware & Equip.  
Leisure Goods   
Mobile Telecommunications   
Software & Computer Services   
 
Source: Our elaborations from FTSE and Dow Jones Indexes (2004) and from Malerba 
and Orsenigo (1996). 
 
Table 2: Mergers and Acquisitions by target country in eight European countries, 1993-
2005 
 
1993-2001
 
2002-2005
 
Countries Number M&A   % M&A Number M&A % M&A 
United Kingdom 932 47.53 (1) 475 59.23 (1) 
France 308 15.71 (2) 106 13.22 (2) 
Germany 269 13.72 (3) 57 7.11  (3) 
Sweden 150 7.65   (4) 43 5.36  (5) 
Norway 95 4.84   (5) 40 4.99  (6) 
Italy 83 4.23   (6) 45 5.61 (4) 
Finland 73 3.72   (7) 11 1.37  (8) 
Denmark 51 2.60   (8) 25 3.12  (7) 
Total 1,961 100.00 802 100.00 
Sources: 1993-2001 Thomson Financial, SDC, see Martynova and Renneboog (2006); 2002-
2005, our elaborations on Datastream and Lexis-Nexis database; the ranking order of the 
frequencies is shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3: M&A activity by sectors in eight European countries, 2002-2005 
Sectors Number of 
target firms 
Number of total 
firms 
% of  
target firms 
Oil & Gas (O&G) 19 154  12.33 
Basic Materials (BM) 31 318 9.75 
Industrials (I) 168 1,329 12.64 
Consumer Goods (CG) 89 721 12.34 
Healthcare (H) 40 358 11.17 
Consumer Services (CS) 178 938 18.97 
Telecomm.(TC)  21 98 21.43 
Utilities (U) 18 125 14.40 
Financial (F) 152 1,481 10.26 
Technology (T) 86 876 9.82 
Total 802 6,398 12.54 
Source: our elaborations on Datastream database 
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Table 4: Results of Binomial Tests for differences between relative frequencies of M&A 
Panel A-Differences between relative frequencies of M&A by countries 
 UK FR GE IT SW DK NW 
UK        
FR 7.14***       
GE 12.88*** 5.74***      
IT 3.05*** -4.09* -9.83***     
SW 7.61*** 0.47 -5.27*** 4.56***    
DK 4.97*** -2.17*** -7.91*** 1.92 -2.64   
NW 4.89*** -2.25** -7.99*** 1.84 -2.72* -0.08  
FN 9.88*** 2.74*** -3.00*** 6.84*** 2.28* 4.92** 4.99*** 
Panel B- Difference between frequencies of M&A by two-digit sectors
 
 O&G BM I CG H CS TC U F 
O&G          
BM 1,94         
I -0,80 -2,74        
CG -0,65 -2,59 0,15       
H 0,51 -1,42 1,32 1,17      
CS -7,18** -9,12*** -6,38*** -6,53*** -7,70***     
TC -9,74*** -11,68*** -8,938*** -9,08*** -10,26*** -2,56**    
U -3,51 -5,45*** -2,71*** -2,86** -4,03** 3,67*** 6,23*   
F 1,21 -0,7245 2,02** 1,87 0,70 8,40*** 10,96*** 4,73*  
T 1,87 -0,0689 2,68*** 2,53** 1,35 9,05*** 11,61*** 5,38** 0,65 
Panel C- Difference between frequencies of M&A by Technological Regimes 
Tehnological Regimes No. Target firms No. Total Firms % target firms 
SMI  264 2,015 13.10 
SMII  109 1,116 9.77 
Difference SMI - SMII   3.33*** 
***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10 % level. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Takeover regulation - the legislative framework in eight countries in the 
period 2002-2005 
 
Mandatory 
bid rule 
(a) 
Squeeze out 
rule (% of 
stocks) 
(b) 
 
Sell out rule 
(% of stocks) 
(c) 
Transparency 
(% of stocks) 
(d) 
Break through 
rule 
( e) 
Passivity 
rule 
( f) 
UK 30 90 90 3 no yes 
FR 33.33 95 95 5 no yes 
GE 30 95 95 5 no yes 
IT 30 98 90 2 yes yes 
SW 40 90 90 5 no yes 
DK 33.33 90 90 5 no yes 
NW 40 90 90 5 no yes 
FN 66.67 90 90 5 no yes 
Legenda: a) percentage of shares that makes compulsory the tender offer to all the shareholders; b) 
percentage of equities that gives the controlling shareholder the right to force the minority shareholders 
to sell their shares; c) the threshold above which the remaining shareholders have the right to sell their 
shares at a fair price; d) the threshold above which the ownership of voting rights have to disclosed; e) 
the rule that permits a bidder to break through the existing voting arrangement and to exercise control as 
in a context of one share-one vote; f) the rule that requires board neutrality in case of anti-takeovers 
measures and that make compulsory the approval by the shareholders meeting. See Appendix, Table A4 
for legislative sources. 
 
 
 40
Table 6: Ownership, shareholders protection and legal systems in eight European countries  
Country Ownership 
concentration 
 
Widely held 
firms 
 
Anti-director 
rights 
(revised index) 
 
Legal system  Takeover 
regulation 
United Kingdom 0.19 63.08 5.0 8.80 5 
France 0.34 14.00 3.5 7.66 2 
Germany 0.48 10.37 3.5 8.95 2 
Italy 0.58 12.98 2.0 7.10 5 
Sweden 0.28 39.18 3.5 8.78 3 
Denmark 0.45 - 4.0 9.08 4 
Norway 0.36 36.77 3.5 8.86 3 
Finland 0.37 28.68 3.5 9.16 3 
Average 0.38 29.30 3.56 8.55 3.37 
Legenda: Ownership concentration: The average percentage of common shares owned by three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest non financial, privately owned domestic firms of a given country 
(Djankov et al. 2008 Tab. XIII and La Porta et al. 1998, Tab.7); Widely held firms: percentage of 
companies that do not have shareholder controlling, at least 20% of votes, in a sample of 5,232 publicly 
traded financial and non financial corporations (Faccio and Lang 2002, Tab. 3); Anti-director rights: the 
revised index by Djankov et al. (2008); this index measures the quality of the legal system and takes 
into account judicial independence, impartiality of courts, protection of intellectual property, military 
interference in the rule of law and integrity of the legal system (see Manchin, 2004); takeover 
regulation: the index is obtained from Table 5 and it scores from 1 to 6. Higher values correspond to a 
legislation that favours takeovers. 
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Table 7: Estimates of takeover frequencies: the role institutional, sectoral and 
technological factors 
 
 
Obs. 
175 
Obs. 
162 
Obs. 
175 
Obs 
175 
Obs. 
175 
Obs. 
175 
Obs. 
175 
Obs. 
175 
Dependent Variable: 
M&A frequency 
Column 
a 
Column 
b 
Column 
c 
Column  
d 
Column 
 e 
Column  
f 
Column  
g 
Column 
h 
Log GDP 
per capita 0.717*** 0.780*** 0.200 0.679*** 0.700*** 0.663*** 0.650*** 0.608*** 
 
(0.185) (0.251) (0.151) (0.172) (0.161) (0.151) (0.133) (0.146 ) 
Concentrated 
Ownership 0.547**  0.394 0.570** 0.526** 0.439** 0.500*** 0.507** 
 
(0.236)  (0.455) (0.228) (0.215) (0.214) (0.197) (0.210) 
Widely held firms  -0.005**       
 
 (0.002)       
Takeover regulation 0.121*** 0.162***  0.114*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.030) (0.049)  (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) ( 0.023) 
Antidirector Rights 
(index revised)   -0.009      
 
  (0.061)      
Market to Book 
value of Equity 
(PBR) 
-0.028*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.029** -0.025** -0.022** -0.017* -0.023** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
Shock in the 
sectoral growth rate    0.011 0.012* 0.013** 0.008 0.009 
 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D     -0.441*    
 
    (0.260)    
R&D *SMI      -0.340 
 
  
 
     (0.309)   
R&D *SMII      -10.472***   
 
     (2.940)   
Innovation       -0.017***  
 
      (0.006)  
Innovation * SMI        -0.010* 
 
       (0.006) 
Innovation* SMII        -0.102*** 
 
       (0.029) 
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  
-2.79*** 
 
 
-2.724*** 
 
-0.757 
 
-2.648*** 
 
-2.673*** 
 
-2.501*** 
 
-2.385*** 
 
-2.342 
 
(0.736) (0.973) (0.655) (0.670) (0.627) (0.587) (0.522) (0.570) 
Chi2 Test 
(Prob>Chi2) 0.0112 0.0114 0.130 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
***Significant at the 1 % level; ** Significant at the 5 % level; * significant at the 10 % level. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Note that the number of observations of 
estimates reported in column b is only 162 since the indicator for widely held firms, introduced 
in the specification, is not available for Denmark.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Classifications of M&A data 
 
 
M&As data
Country Level
8 European Countries
Sectoral Level
39 Datastream Sectors
10 Datstream Industries
6 Technological Intensity
Classes (Eurostat)
2 Technological Regimes
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996)
 
 
 
Figure 2: The geographical patterns of the market for corporate control in 
eight European countries, 2002-2005 
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Source: our elaborations on Datastream database 
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Figure 3: M&A activity in eight European countries: incidence of 
takeovers by two digit sectors 
(% incidence of deals on the total number of firms for each sector) 
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Source: our elaborations on Datastream database 
 
Figure 4: The top markets for corporate control in eight European 
countries: frequency of M&A by four digit sectors, 2002-2005 
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Source: our elaborations on DataStream database 
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Figure 5: Distribution of M&A activity and GDP weights in eight 
European countries, average 2002-2005  
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Source: our elaborations on DataStream database 
 
Figure 6: Incidence of M&A and R&D in eight European countries (2002-2005): 
SMII sectors (Correlation coefficient = -0.31a) 
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Source: our elaborations on DataStream database; a the correlation coefficient, calculated 
by excluding outliers, is significant at the 10% level. 
 
 45
Figure 7: Incidence of M&A and R&D in eight European countries (2002-2005):SMI 
sectors (Correlation coefficient =-0.14 a) 
 
Source : our elaborations on DataStream database: a the correlation coefficient, calculated 
by excluding outliers, is not significant. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: IBC two-digit and four-digit sectors   
Two-digit sectors Four-digit sectors  Two-digit sectors  Four-digit sectors  
Oil and Gas Producers  Oil & Gas Oil Equipment & Services Media 
Chemicals Travel & Leisure 
Industrial Metals Food & Drug Retailers 
Mining 
Consumer Services 
General Retailers Basic Materials 
Forestry & Paper 
  
 
Construction & Materials Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Industrial Transportation Telecommunications Mobile Telecommunications 
Aerospace & Defence 
  
 
Electronic, Electrical Equip. Electricity 
Industrial Engineering Utilities Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
Support Services 
  
 
Industrials 
General Industrials Banks 
Food producers Equity Investment Instruments 
Beverages General Financials 
Tobacco Life Insurance 
Household Goods Non equity Invest. Instruments 
Personal Goods Non Life Insurance 
Leisure Goods 
Financials 
Real Estate 
Consumer Goods 
Automobiles & Parts 
  
 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotech. Technology Hardware & Equip. Healthcare 
Healthcare Equipment 
Technology Software & Computer Services 
Source: Datastream    
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Table A2: Concordance between four digit sectors, technological classes, 
technological regimes 
Techn. 
Regimes
 
Four digit sectors 
(IBC) Technological Classes (IPC) 
Food producers (4) Agriculture 
Beverages (16) Chemical Processes for Food and Tobacco 
Tobacco (4) Chemical, Analytical and Physical Processes 
Household Goods (3) Furniture; (34)Household Electric appliance;  
Personal Goods (2) Clothing and Shoes; (14) Medical Preparations 
Construction & 
Materials (30) Civil Engineering and Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Engineering 
(29) Material Handling Apparatus; (24) Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment; (32) Mechanical Engineering; 
(35) Lighting Systems; (33) Mechanical and Electric 
Technologies; (36) Measurement and control Instruments; 
(23) Industrial Automation 
Industrial Metals (22) Machine Tools 
Industrial 
Transportation (28) Railways and Ships 
Leisure Goods (46) Sport and Toys; (49) Others 
Mobile 
Telecommunication
s 
 
Sc
hu
m
pe
te
r 
M
a
rk
 
I 
Software & 
Computer Services  
Aerospace & 
Defence 
(27) Aircraft; (47) Ammunition and Weapons; (48) Nuclear 
Technology 
Oil and Gas 
Producers (6) Gas, Hydrocarbons and Oil 
Oil Equipment & 
Services (31) Engines, Turbines and pumps 
Chemicals (8) Organic Chemicals; (9) Macromolecular Compounds 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology (12) Biochemical, Bio and Genetic Engineering 
Healthcare 
Equipment (37) Laser Technology; (38) Optics and Photography 
Electronic, 
Electrical Equip. (42) Electronic Components; Multimedia Systems 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunication
s 
(44) Telecommunications 
Sc
hu
m
pe
te
r 
M
a
rk
 
II
 
Technology 
Hardware & Equip. (39) Computers; (40) Other Office Equipment 
Mining (5) Mining 
Automobiles & 
Parts (26)Vehicles, Motorcycles 
General Industrials   O
th
er
 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
 
 Forestry & Paper  
Source: Datastream; Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) 
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Table A3 Classification of four-digit sectors by technological intensity 
and knowledge 
Manufacturing sectors and technological intensity 
Hi- Tech Medium Hi-Tech Medium Low-Tech Low-Tech 
Aerospace & Defense Chemicals General Industrials 
Forestry & 
Paper 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology 
Automobiles & 
Parts 
Oil and Gas 
Producers 
Food 
producers 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Industrial 
Transportation Industrial Metals Beverages 
Mobile 
Telecommunications 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Construction & 
Materials Tobacco 
Technology Hardware 
& Equipement   
Household 
Goods 
Healthcare Equipment   
Personal 
Goods 
Leisure 
Goods 
Service sectors and knowledge 
High Knowledge Low Knowledge 
 
Software & Computer Services Media 
Support Services Travel & Leisure 
Oil Equipment & Services Food & Drug Retailers 
Banks General Retailers 
Equity Investment Instruments Electricity 
General Financials Gas, Water & Multi utilities 
Life Insurance  
No- equity Invest. Instruments 
 
Non Life Insurance 
 
Real Estate 
 
Source: Our elaborations on FTSE and Dow Jones Indexes (2004), 
Eurostat
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Table A4: Sources for takeover regulation  
UK The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (2002), The Takeover Code 
Sweden  The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority’s Regulations Governing Rules 
of Conduct on the Securities Market (2002) 
Tude B., “Swedish Securities Council Issues Statement on Mandatory Bids”, 
International Financial Law Review, 2000
 
Finland Himonas D., “The Financial Supervision Authority Imposes New Guidelines”, 
International Financial Law Review, 2000 
Securities Market Act 26.5.1989/495
 
Norway Act on Securities Trading, Act no. 79 , 19th June 1997 
Germany Roos M. – Cornett C. (2002), Takeover season in Germany, AltAssets 
Schmid F.A. – Wahrenburg M. (2002), Mergers and Acquisition in Germany, 
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper Series 2002- 027A
 
France Décret n. 2003-1109 du 21 Novembre 2003 Relatif à l'Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers 
Règlement général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers, 2006
 
Italy  Testo Unico Finanziario, Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 , “Testo 
unico delle Disposizioni in Materia di Intermediazione Finanziaria, ai sensi 
degli Articoli 8 e 21 della Legge 6 febbraio 1996, n. 52”
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Table A5: Description of variables included in our estimates and their sources 
 Dependent 
Variable:  
M&A 
frequency 
Percentage of traded firms at sectoral level in the period 2002-2005 that have been targets 
of completed and not completed M&A.  
Source: Datastream. 
 Regressors:  
Concentrated 
Ownership  
The average percentage of common shares owned by three largest shareholders in the 10 
largest non financial, privately owned domestic firms of a given country. Source: La Porta 
et al. (1998). 
Widely held 
firms  
 
Percentage of companies that do not have shareholder controlling at least 20% of votes. 
Source: Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Takeover 
regulation  
Index that captures the role of different measures that favours takeovers (see Table 5 
above). It scores from 1 to 6; higher values correspond to a legislation that favours 
takeovers. 
 
Anti-director 
Rights 
revised  
The index for shareholder rights, that updates and corrects the original measure of La 
Porta et al (1998). Source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
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al
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d 
co
u
n
tr
y 
v
ar
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bl
es
 
(I)
 
Log GDP per 
capita 
(average 
2002-2005) 
The logarithm of per-capita GDP, proxy for the countries’ wealth. Source: Eurostat. 
Shock in the 
sectoral 
growth, 
2002-2005 
The deviation of value added of each four-digit sector from the annual average GDP 
growth. Source: Eurostat.  
Se
ct
o
ra
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
(S
) 
Market to 
book value  
of equity 
Average sectoral level of company’s Price to Book Ratio for the 3 years before the deal. 
Source: companies’ balance sheets (Datastream). 
Sectoral 
R&D 
intensity 
Sectoral R&D expenditure out the country’s GDP. Source: Eurostat. 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
ca
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
(T
EC
) 
Percentage of 
innovative 
firms  
Percentage of firms at sectoral level that undertake innovative activities.  
Source: Eurostat, Fourth Community Innovation Survey.  
 
 
